ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the relation between the minimal positive relevant logic B + and intersection and union type theories. There is a marvellous coincidence between these very differently motivated research areas. First, we show a perfect fit between the Intersection Type Discipline ITD and the tweaking B ∧ T of B + , which saves implication → and conjunction ∧ but drops disjunction ∨. The filter models of the λ-calculus (and its intimate partner Combinatory Logic CL) of the first author and her co-authors then become theory models of these calculi. (The logician's Theory is the algebraist's Filter.) The coincidence extends to a dual interpretation of key particles -the subtype ≤ translates to provable →, type intersection ∩ to conjunction ∧, function space → to implication and whole domain ω to the (trivially added but trivial) truth T. This satisfying ointment contains a fly. For it is right, proper and to be expected that type union ∪ should correspond to the logical disjunction ∨ of B + . But the simulation of functional application by a fusion (or modus ponens product) operation • on theories leaves the key Bubbling lemma of work on ITD unprovable for the ∨-prime theories now appropriate for the modelling. The focus of the present paper lies in an appeal to Harrop theories which are (a) prime and (b) closed under fusion. A version of the Bubbling lemma is then proved for Harrop theories, which accordingly furnish a model of λ and CL.
INTRODUCTION
This paper receives the ordinal ω for a couple of reasons. Its predecessors in Meyer's "semantics of entailment" series (mainly with Routley) were called 1, 2, etc. It's time for a summing up at the limit. A second reason has to do with the role of the constant ω in the filter models of λ developed by Dezani and her colleagues (mainly at Torino). ω is transmuted in various respects here -logically to a "Church constant" T, and functionally to a space T → T. But the pun remains.
One had ventured to hope that the rise of computer science would bring with it a bright new day for logic. Or at least it might bring back some good old days, beginning with those in which Aristotle founded logic in order to give an account of how people reason, when they are reasoning correctly. For if our computing machines are to do most of our thinking in the present millennium (as is not unlikely), then some improvement in our start-of-themillennium logical theories is desirable. In particular Anderson, Belnap, Dunn et al. in [1] [2] and Routley et al. in [20] have proposed systems of relevant logic and entailment as vehicles for this improvement. In this paper we build on our previous studies of the semantics of entailment on the one hand and of models for the λ-calculus on the other to delve more deeply into what relevant logics are about.
With Sylvan (né Routley) 1 , Meyer proposed in [19] and [18] a minimal positive relevant logic B + . As they conceived it, B + had a role to play for relevant logics analogous to that played by the system K among normal modal logics with a Kripke-style "possible worlds" semantics in the style of [16] . That is, B + satisfied just those semantical postulates that we took to be common to arbitrary positive logics in the relevant family. Thus on our semantics other positive logics arose from B + on the addition of specific postulates. But the main ideas -e.g., that B ∧ C is true at a "world" w iff B is true at w and C is true at w -remain through whatever additions are appropriate to get famous logics like relevant R + or intuitionist J.
Moreover, the main candidate additions have a combinatory character, in the sense that they are suggested by the (so-called Curry-Howard) isomorphism between candidate implicational theorems and combinators set out in [8] . Indeed, the semantical postulates which match these theorems may be almost read off the Curry-Howard correspondence. But, as it turned out, there are other candidate theorems -for example, some involving both ∧ and → in their formulation -which also seemed to match combinators. Back in the early '70's, Routley and Meyer did not know what to make of these new "types" for combinators. But they were sufficiently impressed by them to pronounce CL the "key to the universe" in [18] .
Many years thereupon passed, in some of which Meyer sought to interest members of the CL-λ community in (what he took to be) this satisfying interplay between ideas from relevant and combinatory logics. But it was only when Bunder brought Hindley to Australia (and to ANU in particular) in the late 1980's that progress was made. For Meyer and Errol Martin learned from Hindley of the extension of Curry's type theory that had been developed in the work of Coppo and Dezani in Torino and set out most fully by them with Barendregt in [6] . For [6] had added ∧ to the pure → Curry vocabulary; and this enabled them, near enough, to fix ((p → q) ∧ p) → q as the principal type of λx.xx.
When Meyer saw this example in [6] , he was very pleased. For λx.xx is one of the terms that has no type on Curry's scheme. Still, on the "correspondence theory" implicit in [19] , with the ternary relation R to explicate → on our relational "worlds semantics", the validity of the formula ((p → q) ∧ p) → q enforces and is enforced by the total ternary reflexivity postulate Rwww. Rightly viewed, that semantical postulate is just a way of saying that λx.xx (a.k.a. WI or SII, for CL fans) is a good guy. The logical content of the postulate is that the formula ((p → q) ∧ p) → q (which expresses conjunctive modus ponens) is a good guy. But it is nonetheless optional whether or not this formula should 1 Sylvan died in June, 1996, while visiting Bali, Indonesia. After so much joint work with him on the semantics of relevant logics, we dedicate this further essay to his memory. be taken as a logical truth. At the most fundamental relevant level (i.e., that of B + ), the formula is a non-theorem (despite any logical propaganda that you may have imbibed.) 2 .
Now [6] saw the intersection type discipline (henceforth, ITD) of that paper as a way of providing filter models for λ. Along with → and ∧ the ITD introduced a new (universal) type T, which is a type possessed by every term. But from the logical perspective T may be viewed simply as a greatest truth, which is entailed by every proposition. And once union types with ∨ are introduced as well, as they were for example in [4] , we can feed our intuitions with the following 
ITD = B∧T
We set out first the postulates on the intersection type theory ITD [6] , and we relate them to the →∧ fragment of B + extended with a greatest truth T. We call thil this fragment B ∧ T 3 . Without loss of generality ITD may be assumed to be formulated with a binary predicate ≤, a constant T (a.k.a. ω), and binary function symbols → and ∧. We assume a countable infinity of (type) variables, for which we use 'p', 'q', 'r', etc. As syntactical variables for (type) terms we use upper-case 'A', 'B', etc., decorating our syntactical variables as takes our fancy. We take leave of the right and good and eminently sensible syntactical conventions set out by Curry in [7] and [8] by laying it down that equal connectives shall be associated (shock, horror!) to the right, and that ∧ shall bind more tightly than →. As axiom schemes and rules of ITD we choose the following 4 :
In a nutshell, ITD has ∧-semilattice properties, with monotonic replacement properties for ∧ and (appropriately) for →, with T as a top element (mathematically identifiable as T → T). Now how did Hindley know, when he heard from Meyer about B + , that it was just (a somewhat tweaked version of) ITD? 5 Here are some axiom schemes and rules sufficient 2 Strengthen B + (e.g., to intuitionist J or even R + ) and conjunctive modus ponens is valid! 3 To be pronounced, "BAT". 4 Save for notational changes these are exactly the postulates of [6] , using ⇒ to express rules. 5 Historically the tweaking should be vice versa, as B + anticipated ITD by a decade. But nobody knew that.
for B + , formulated in ∧, ∨, →.
As rules we choose

→E.
A
Note the subtle difference between the "prefixing" RulB and the "suffixing" RulB . Together with →E either yields a derived "transitivity" rule, which we might set down as
Three moves, all trivial, suffice to transform B + into ITD. The first is to replace → when it is the principal connective of a formula with ≤. (This has the side effect of making the formula easier to read, while it coincides with the idea that entailment is what logic is principally about anyway.) The second move is to drop ∨ and all its works. (They will be back.) And the final move is to add (the "Church constant") T, together with the axioms
Top.
A → T Top→. T → T → T When B + has been so massaged, we call it B∧T. I.e., we presuppose a translation * from the vocabulary of ITD to that of B∧T, such that p * = p and T * = T for all atoms, and otherwise (A ∧ B)
And we now give a simple metavaluations argument that for all elementary statements A ≤ B of ITD, we have A ≤ B a theorem of ITD iff A * → B * is a theorem of B∧T.
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Note that it is elementary that ITD ⊆ B∧T on the * translation, since the axioms and rules of the former are readily derived in B∧T. For the converse we define a class MTR of metatruths thus: Inclusion from left to right is trivial as noted. And the converse holds given the coherence lemma, in virtue of (i) under v →. End of proof. 6 Binary connectives are also ranked ∧, ∨, → in order of increasing scope. We continue as above to use ⇒ as a metalogical connective in framing rules; ⇒ also associates here to the right. 7 Venneri uses another argument in [21] . But she notes the (previously unpublished) argument set out here.
We shall now give a "worlds semantics" for ITD, adapting [19] and Fine's contribution to [1] [2] . 8 We take a positive model structure (henceforth, +ms) to be a structure K =< K, • >, where K is a set (of worlds) and • is a binary operation on K.
9 Let V ar be the set of variables, and let 2 = {0, 1} be the set of truth-values. A valuation v on the +ms K is a function from V ar × K to 2. Let Form be the set of all formulas. A valuation v on K is extended to an interpretation I from F orm × K to 2 as follows 10 for w ∈ K:
And we now say that A entails B on a valuation v in K (equivalently, on the associated
Semantic completeness for ITD will amount to the claim that A ≤ B is a theorem iff A entails B. Before proving it we enter some important definitions. First, where U, V ⊆ F orm, define the fusion operation • by
A theory U is any non-empty subset of F orm which is closed under ≤ and ∧. 11 I.e., U must satisfy
A ∈ U and B ∈ U ⇒ A ∧ B ∈ U The empty theory, to which we have sometimes appealed in the past, is ruled out here. So every theory must therefore contain the constant T, in view of ≤E and Top above.
The calculus of theories CT =< CT, • > is the structure such that (i) CT is the collection of all theories and (ii) • is the fusion operation defined by D•. It is easy to verify that if U and V are theories so also is U •V . To each A ∈ F orm there corresponds its principal theory A↑= {B : A ≤ B in ITD}. The canonical valuation c in CT is the valuation such that, for all p ∈ V ar and U ∈ CT , c(p, U ) = 1 iff p ∈ U . It is elementary to observe that the extension of c to a canonical interpretation C on the rubric above extends the property to C(A, U ) = 1 iff A ∈ U , for all formulas A and theories U , invoking T →, etc. 
Canonical lemma. For all
A, B ∈ F orm, A ≤ B in ITD iff A entails B on c in CT. Proof. (⇒) Assume A ≤ B and C(A, U ) = 1. Then A ∈ U ; so B ∈ U by ≤E, whence C(B, U ) = 1. (⇐) Assume A entails B on the canonical valuation c. Then in particular C(A, A↑) = 1 ⇒ C(B, A↑) = 1. But C(A, A↑) = 1. Whence A ≤ B in
The calculus of theories CT is a model for λ and CL
In Algebraese these are already principal results of [6] and [10] respectively. But here we are speaking Logicese, whence we say theory where the cited papers say filter. By λ we mean the type-free λK β-calculus, invented by Church in the birth year of one of us, and exhaustively studied by Barendregt in [5] . By CL we mean Curry's (weak) combinatory logic, as summarised in [15] . As CL is already definable in λ in well-known ways 12 , it will suffice here to recount the [6] proof that CT =< CT, • > is a model of λ. First, we define an equivalence ≡ in ITD on F orm by
[6] (which uses '∼' where we here use '≡') rightly suggests that ITD may be considered modulo ≡, in which case ≤ becomes a partial order. They also prove an important lemma, which goes into our notation as
Assume moreover that we have i∈I (A i → B i ) ≤ C → D for the finite non-empty index set I. Then there is a finite non-empty subset J of I such that
The Bubbling lemma (ii) is exceedingly important in [6] . Indeed, that it fails in the richer environment of all of B + greatly complicates the story that we are telling here.
But let us dwell first on (more or less) easy success, which is preferable where available. A λ-valuation v in CT shall be a function which assigns theories to λ-variables x, y, etc. If U is a theory, by v[U/x] we mean the λ-valuation 13 defined by:
Each λ-valuation v is extended to the corresponding λ-interpretation V on the following rubric: where I is a finite non empty set of indices.
14 For the correctness of our definition, we need all the λ-interpretations to be theories. Proof is by induction on the construction of the λ-interpretation V defined above. The crucial case which requires the Bubbling lemma (ii) is clause Vλ. A preliminary observation is that our λ-interpretations are monotone, i.e. if v(x) ⊆ v (x) for all variables x which occur free in M , then V(M ) ⊆ V (M ). This can be easily checked by induction on the construction of λ-interpretations.
By the Bubbling lemma (ii) we get C ≤ A i for all i ∈ J and i∈J B i ≤ D for some J ⊆ I. This implies C ↑⊇ A i ↑ for all i ∈ J, which together with
is a theory by induction.
It is easy to verify (and already done in [6] ), that for all v the λ-interpretation V is a syntactic λ-model according to [14] , i.e. that :
. Also this property can be easily shown by induction on the construction of λ-interpretations. By definition of • and clause Vλ we get V(λx.M )•U = {B : ∃A ∈ F orm(A → B ∈ V(λx.M ) and A ∈ U )} = {B : ∃A ∈ F orm(B ∈ V[U/x](M ) and A ∈ U )} = A∈U V[A↑ /x](M ), so we can conclude using the compositionality of λ-interpretations.
The calculus of theories on CT∨ is not a model for λ and CL
We can enrich ITD by adding the following axiom schemes and rules:
We call this extension ITD∨. Now we can transform B + into ITD∨ with only two moves. It suffices to replace → when it is the principal connective of a formula with ≤. And to add T with the axioms Top and Top→. The difference with the translation * described in section 1 is that we don't drop ∨. We call * * this new translation. So the old translation * maps B∧T into ITD; the new translation * * generalises the old one, since it maps B + into ITD∨. As expected, the coincidence theorem also holds for the translation * * ; i.e. we have: 14 We extend our convention by making V[U/x](y) the interpretation V determines by the x-variant v[U/x](y).
Extended coincidence theorem. ITD∨ = B + on the * * translation. The proof can be given using the same metavaluation argument that we introduced for proving the coincidence theorem. It suffices to add to the definition of the class MTR the clause:
v ∨. A * * ∨ B * * ∈ MTR iff either A * * ∈ MTR or B * * ∈ MTR
In fact it is easy to verify that the coherence lemma still holds, i.e. that A ∈ B + ⇒ A * * ∈ MTR.
We can continue as in section 1. Let K be a +ms and F orm∨ be the set of all formulas in ITD∨. We can define an interpretation I from F orm∨ × K to 2 by adding the following clause: This is halfway to where we arrived happily at the end of section 1. We would like to supply the other (completeness) half and then to continue as in section 2. Note however that the canonical lemma above does NOT extend smoothly to CT∨. Extending the canonical valuation we obtain an interpretation which does not satisfy clause T ∨. The obvious example is (A ∨ B)↑: A ∨ B ∈ (A ∨ B)↑ but A, B / ∈ (A ∨ B)↑. We can generalise ≡ to ITD∨ in the obvious way. But we do not know how to go on. The first problem is that the Bubbling lemma (ii) no longer holds. The counter-example is under the eyes of everybody: it is just the axiom →∨E. The unpleasant consequence of this is that { i∈I (A i → B i ) : 
An obvious recipe to remedy this drawback is to force the interpretation of an abstraction to be a theory, by defining
where by U↑ we mean the minimal theory containing the set of formulas U , i.e. the closure of U under ∧ and ≤. But the problem we pushed out of the door will come back through the window. For this new definition of λ-interpretation loses the key property characterising models of λ and CL -i.e., the property Iλ•. The previously introduced λ-term M 0 and 15 The closure (↑) allows us to avoid intersections of arrow formulas (cf. clause Vλ).
the λ-valuation v 0 are again good choices to point out our failure. In fact now we oblige A ∨ B → C to be an element of V 0 (M 0 ); therefore we have
But the other clauses of λ-interpretation are unchanged, so we have as before V 0 [(A ∨ B)↑ /x](yxx) = T↑. We must conclude that Iλ• fails! The underlying point of this counter example is that the set of ∨-prime theories is NOT closed under fusion. As usual, a theory is ∨-prime iff it contains either A or B whenever it contains A ∨ B. So, ∨-prime theories are exactly the theories which satisfy clause T ∨. We can easily show that ∨-prime theories are NOT closed under fusion, as follows: let p, q, r be (type) variables,
∈ Z and r / ∈ Z.
The calculus of Harrop theories HCT is a model for λ and CL
The crucial idea to which we appeal in this paper to overcome the failure of the previous section is in Harrop's paper [13] . To take advantage of it, we define the set HF orm ⊆ F orm∨ of Harrop formulas as follows:
p ∈ HF orm for all p ∈ V ar T ∈ HF orm if A, B ∈ HF orm then A ∧ B ∈ HF orm if A ∈ F orm∨ and B ∈ HF orm then A → B ∈ HF orm Using this definition we can easily verify that:
Claim. If C ∈ HF orm then there are two finite sets I and K of indices, variables p k ∈ V ar for all k ∈ K and formulas A i ∈ F orm∨, B i ∈ HF orm for all i ∈ I such that I ∪ K is non-empty and
In fact, if C is T, then C ≡ T → T. If C is A ∧ B with A, B ∈ HF orm the claim follows by induction, and lastly if C is a variable or of the form A → B the claim is immediate.
The main feature of Harrop formulas is that they allow us to recover a (restricted) version of the Bubbling lemma.
Bubbling lemma for F orm∨. (i)
(ii) Assume C ∈ HF orm and it is NOT the case that D ≡ T. Assume moreover that we have ( i∈I (A i → B i )) ∧ ( k∈K p k ) ≤ C → D for the finite index sets I, K. Then I is non-empty and there is a finite non-empty subset J of I such that
The proof if point (i) by induction on the construction of ≡ is standard. The proof of point (ii) involves a stratification of formulas and we give it in the Appendix.
We want to consider only theories which are essentially based on Harrop formulas. For this reason we say that a theory U ⊆ F orm∨ is an Harrop theory if and only if for all A ∈ U there is A ∈ U such that A ∈ HF orm and A ≤ A. In the remaining of this section we will deal only with the set HCT of Harrop theories.
We show the soundness of the calculus of theories HCT =< HCT, • >, i.e., that Harrop theories are closed under the fusion operation •. By definition U •V = {B : ∃A ∈ F orm∨(A → B ∈ U and A ∈ V )}. We will prove that for all B ∈ U •V there is B ∈ U •V such that B ∈ HF orm and B ≤ B. The case B ≡ T is trivial, so in the following we assume B ≡ T. Now A ∈ V , where V is an Harrop theory, implies that there is A ∈ V such that A ∈ HF orm and A ≤ A. From A → B ∈ U we get A → B ∈ U , since A ≤ A implies A → B ≤ A → B and U being a theory is closed under ≤. Since also U is an Harrop theory, there is C ∈ U such that C ∈ HF orm and C ≤ A → B. By the claim we have C ≡ ( i∈I (A i → B i )) ∧ ( k∈K p k ) for some sets I, K of indices, variables p k ∈ V ar, and formulas A i ∈ F orm∨, B i ∈ HF orm for all i ∈ I. Now ( i∈I (A i → B i )) ∧ ( k∈K p k ) ≤ A → B, B ≡ T, and A ∈ HF orm imply that there is a finite non-empty subset J of I such that A ≤ i∈J A i and i∈J B i ≤ B by the Bubbling lemma (ii) for F orm∨. We will show now that i∈J B i is a correct choice for B . First notice that each B i ∈ HF orm, whence i∈J B i ∈ HF orm by definition.
. Therefore we get i∈J B i ∈ U •V , and this concludes our proof.
As in section 2, to prove that we have really obtained a λ-model it is crucial to show compositionality of interpretations. In the present case this is stronger, since we can limit our consideration to Harrop formulas.
Compositionality Lemma. For all Harrop theories U , λ-H-valuations v and λ-terms M
theory p → q ∨ r ∈ U implies there is A ∈ HF orm ∩ U such that A ≤ p → q ∨ r. Now clearly we can only choose either p → q or p → r as A.
CONCLUSION
The main result of the present paper is that the calculus of Harrop theories over the minimal relevant logic B + is a model of λ and CL. We seek nonetheless a better model in a wider class of ∨-prime B + -theories, as a direction for future research and for the further illumination of logics and of types. Recently further progress has been made in this direction: [9] compares B + with the semantics-based approach to subtyping introduced by Frisch, Castagna and Benzaken [12] in the definition of a type system with intersection and union. [9] shows that -for the functional core of the system -such notion of subtyping, which is defined in purely set-theoretical terms, coincides with the relevant entailment of the logic B + .
APPENDIX
We will use a stratification of F orm∨. A similar stratification was considered in [3] .
Specialisation of ≤ to the sets T i are now introduced, whose definition exploits the syntactical form of the types in T i . Proof. By induction the construction of ≤ i .
Definition 2. ≤
We will now introduce maps from arbitrary formulas belonging to F orm∨ into their conjunctive/disjunctive normal forms in T ∧∨ and T ∨∧ , respectively.
Definition 4.
The maps m ∧∨ : F orm∨ → T ∧∨ and m ∨∧ : F orm∨ → T ∨∧ are defined by simultaneous induction the structure of formulae: 
The following proposition states that conjunctive/disjunctive normal forms are logically equivalent to their counterimages under m ∧∨ () and m ∨∧ (), and that the specialised relations ≤ i are actually restrictions of ≤ to the sets T i respectively. 
Proof.
(i) By induction on the structure of A. E.g. if A = B → C then, by induction hypothesis, we have B ≡ m ∨∧ (B) = i∈I B i and C ≡ m ∧∨ (C) = j∈J C j , so that, by repeated uses of (→∧I), (→∨E) and (Mon→) we conclude that
(ii) By straightforward induction on the construction of ≤ i . and ∃k ∈ K ∀r ∈ K k ∃s ∈ L l , C k,r ≤ → D l,s ⇒ ∀j ∈ J, l ∈ L ∃i ∈ I, k ∈ K,
The converse of Proposition 5(ii) is false, an example is just axiom (→∨E).
We eventually come to the proof of the Bubbling lemma for F orm∨ using the notion of ∨-prime formulas. By Proposition 5(i), C ≡ k∈K C k : hence, since C is ∨-prime, there exists k 0 ∈ K such that C ≤ C k0 . Choose one such k 0 and, for any q ∈ Q, define
which is non-empty by the above statement. Finally, we take J = q∈Q J q . Now, for all i ∈ J, there exists h ∈ H i such that C k0 ≤ A i,h ≤ A i : therefore C ≤ C k0 ≤ i∈J A i .
To conclude, for all q ∈ Q there is i ∈ J q and l ∈ L i such that B i ≤ B i,l ≤ D q : then i∈J B i ≤ D q for all q, and, therefore, i∈J B i ≤ q∈Q D q ≡ D.
The condition C is ∨-prime in point (ii) of the above theorem is necessary. A counterexample is axiom (→∨E).
